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ABSTRACT
Compensation and negotiation are advocated by many as additions
to the current energy facility siting process. Why, given their
apparent desirability, are compensation and negotiation not more
frequently observed? Hypotheses based on theory address this
question. Before negotiations may occur, parties to a conflict
must possess something to trade as well as something to be gained in
the negotiations. Because negotiation and compensation are seldom
applied to siting processes, people are unsure how to use them.
Evidence from the Grayrocks Dam case in Wyoming, and the Montague
Nuclear Power Plant case in Massachusetts, indicates that these
hypotheses are valid. The cases further indicate that the siting
process, as structured, impedes rather than accomodates compensation
and negotiations. Bargaining leverage is often not possessed by all
affected groups and individuals. People have traditional expectations
of the siting process which do not include negotiations or compensation
agreements. Compensation and negotiation are frequently viewed with
suspicion and as illegitimate and are therefore rejected.
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Should compensation and negotiation be desired responses to energy
facility siting problems, means of overcoming the obstacles outlined
here must be developed and analyzed. Structural changes to the siting
process and guidelines directing the use of compensation and negotiation
seem warranted as initial steps.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence S. Bacow
Assistant Professor
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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PREFACE
The purpose of the following analysis is to present the potential
role compensation and negotiation may play in the energy facility siting
process. Specifically, this presentation will address four questions.
First, why is the current siting process criticized? Second, why are
compensation and negotiation often cited as potential tools with which
to avoid siting process shortcomings? Third, if compensation and
negotiation are desirable additions to the current process, why are they
not observed more frequently and successfully? Finally, how may compen-
sation and negotiation be incorporated into the siting process?
Theoretical economists have long pondered the potential resolution
of market failures using market mechanisms rather than direct regulation.
This thesis does not attempt to recount the entirety of economic theory
supporting this contention nor does it purport to prove or disprove the
theory. Instead, a brief theoretical introduction to the problem
currently encountered in siting energy facilities will be provided. The
theory will then be tested empirically. This thesis presents but does
not test the argument that compensation and negotiation are able to
overcome failures in current siting processes. Instead, it accepts
the argument as valid and then proceeds one step further and asks the
question: Why, given the apparent desirability of compensation and
negotiation, do we not observe their successful application more often?
This analysis should be of value to several groups. It will provide
policy-makers at the federal and state level with an understanding of
the empirical context in which facility siting policies are applied. It
will further illuminate structural and social constraints hindering
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current policies. Additionally, this analysis provides local officials,
individuals and groups affected by proposed large scale developments with
an alternative means to evaluate and develop responses to such proposals.
Chapter I describes the problem to be addressed. It outlines
several criticisms with the current energy facility siting process.
Further, Chapter I explains how compensation and negotiation may
address these criticisms. Finally, after establishing the nature of
the problem and a proposed solution to it, Chapter I concludes with
several hypotheses as to why this apparently beneficial addition to
the siting process is not frequently and successfully observed. These
hypotheses will then be tested using two siting cases.
Chapter II presents the Grayrocks Dam case in Wyoming. The
hypotheses developed in Chapter I will be analyzed in the case
presentation. This case highlights several problems in addition to
those hypothesized which need to be overcome before compensation
and negotiation can be successfully applied to siting facilities.
Chapter III similarly presents the Montague Nuclear Power Plant case
in western Massachusetts. In this case, compensation and negotiation,
although considered and attempted on several occasions, never succeeded.
Again, Chapter I's hypotheses are supplemented by new observations
lending insight into why negotiation and compensation are seldom
applied to the current siting process.
Chapter IV concludes the thesis with a summary analysis of the
hypotheses developed in Chapter I in light of the two case presentations.
Additionally, it presents and analyzes other problems encountered when
- 9 -
attempts are made to use negotiations and compensation in the siting
process. From this analysis, suggestions for overcoming obstacles
currently hindering compensation and negotiations in the energy facility
siting process are presented.
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CHAPTER I
ENERGY FACILITY SITING:
THE PROBLEM AND A RESPONSE TO IT
Market Failure in the Energy Facility Siting Process
While energy consumption and forecasted demand for energy continue
to increase, utilities are encountering difficulties in siting proposed
energy facilities. Groups and individuals concerned with the disamenities
accompanying energy facility development are rising in opposition and
effectively delaying, and often halting, facility construction. Underlying
this opposition is the market's failure to account for the social costs
inherent in development decisions.
When choosing a site on which to construct an energy facility, a
utility considers the costs associated with facility construction and
operation at several locations and chooses that site which is least
costly. "Least costly" to the developer does not necessarily mean a
proposed facility is "least costly" to society, though. Utilities freely
use a site community's amenities to attract workers and management
personnel. The town's air is used as a sink for pollutants and its water
for cooling or waste disposal purposes. Energy development brings
increasing population, traffic, municipal expenditures and other
characteristics of the "boom town" problem. Since the market system fails
to incorporate these external effects into development decisions, the costs
imposed must be borne by society. These costs are external to a utility's
evaluations; there is no incentive to include them in initial site consid-
erations. It is this market failure that causes problems observed in pro-
posed energy facility siting cases today.
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Four Criticisms of the Siting Process
In The Public Use of Private Interest, Charles Schultze discusses
the failures of private markets to account for the social costs of
their activities. He notes:
"The problem is not that side effects exist, but
that the benefits they confer or the costs they
impose are often not reflected in the prices and
costs that guide private decisions.. .often the
side effects impose costs (or confer benefits)
on large numbers of people who were not parties
to the transaction." [12]
Side effects do accompany construction and operation of energy
facilities (and other large developments) and these side effects
cause damage in varying amounts to different people. The current
energy facility siting process fails to encourage a more complete
accounting of costs associated with proposed facilities. Current
siting guidelines and regulatory restrictions allow developers to
ignore many social consequences of their projects. These failings
have been attacked on four accounts by theoretical economists and
critics of the siting process.
First, these social costs cause opposition to facilities. Those
persons receiving costs in excess of benefits promote their best
interests by opposing the proposed facility. This opposition may
lead to facility construction delays or disapproval when the project
may actually be net beneficial to society and therefore should be
sited. [6,7,10]
Second, "inefficient" sites may be chosen. A developer, not forced
to account for the full range of costs as well as benefits accompanying
a project, may choose to site the wrong plant in the wrong place -- the
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least cost site will not be chosen and resources may be expended
inefficiently. [2,7,10,12]
Third, the outcome is "unfair." As Schultze noted, many will
benefit by a project at the expense of a few. It seems desirable that
those bearing excess costs from a facility be repaid by those
benefitting. [4,7,10,12]
Fourth, uncompensated "social costs" incite further "demoralization
costs." Individuals accepting the precedent that no compensation will
be paid for development impacts may make "second-best" decisions when
choosing where to live, work or visit. Their utility loss is a "cost"
to society. [4,7,10]
While all four market failure consequences cause concern about the
current siting process, this thesis will concentrate its analysis on
attributes of the opposition that arises and po tential means for over-
coming these. As will be seen, the remaining three consequences are
indirectly addressed by proposed solutions to the first.
A Response to Market Failure in the Siting Process
Schultze outlines three "social arrangements" for overcoming
market failures causing social costs:
1 -- prohibit the cost-imposing project from occurring;
2 -- "make it up to the losers either with monetary payments
(compensation) or with offsetting changes that improve their
welfare (logrolling); or,
3 -- rely on a tax transfer system to even things out in the end. [12]
This thesis explores Schultze's second "arrangement." If the current
process does indeed fail on the above four accounts, how might
compensation offset these failures?
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Webster defines "to compensate" as:
"To be equivalent to in value or effect; to balance,
offset, recompense, repay, satisfy."
and, "to negotiate" as:
"To treat with another respecting purchase and sale;
to confer with another in bargaining or trade;...
to hold conference and discussions with a view to
reaching agreement on a treaty, league, contract, etc."
Compensation and negotiation are complimentary; they work hand-in-hand
in resolving conflicts and guiding exchanges. Compensation, in the
true sense of the word, should be viewed as payment for costs imposed
just as we pay workers for services rendered or shopkeepers for goods
purchased. Negotiations serve to bring parties together to agree on
price. In this thesis the two terms -- compensation and negotiation --
will often be used simul taneously. Although they have two separate
meanings,: as noted above, they occur together in practice and as
proposed additions to the siting process.
Compensation may take the form of money, but not necessarily so.
In siting cases nationwide, compensation has occurred with the means
of exchange being parks, planning grants, impact studies, schools and
prepayment of property taxes.[l,3,8,9] Further, compensation may take
the form of "logrolling" concessions, as Schultze noted, in which approvals
may be given in exchange for support on another issue. These exchanges
are,in a sense,no different from the exchanges made in the barter
economies of many lesser developed countries. In barter economies,
money is not used when making transaction. Instead, the goods to be
exchanged have their own specific values to the seller and the buyer.
Agreements reached between any parties are based upon these relative
- 14 -
values.
In siting cases, as in barter economies, people face a decision
to accept or reject a proposed exchange. Exchange of a good in a barter
economy is comparable to the siting case in which a utility essentially
"offers" to site a facility in a particular community. The good to
be exchanged in the siting case is the energy facility. This good
includes desirable and undesirable aspects. It brings energy and often
prestige to an area in addition to jobs, tax revenues and an economic
stimulus. On the other hand, it also brings people, housing construction,
increased service demands and government expenditures to accomodate
these expanding needs. Impacts on the natural as well as human
environments accompany energy development and rapid growth.
These costs and benefits must be weighed by the "buyer" in the
siting case (ie. community and environmental groups, government officials)
to determine the appropriate response to the proposed exchange. The
buyer's means of exchange are usually support (or non-opposition) in
addition to permits and approvals required for facility construction and
operation to proceed. If the proposed facility is perceived to be
"net beneficial" (benefits outweigh costs to be imposed), support
is expected from those persons responding to the siting. If
perceived as "net costly" (costs outweigh perceived benefits), concerned
parties will oppose the exchange and work to keep it from occurring.
Problems are evident in the current siting process because:
1 -- Affected groups and individuals have different concerns
and therefore different perceptions of a facility's benefits
and costs.
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2 -- The process provides no opportunities for concerned groups
to adjust the benefit/cost ratio to make it less costly to
them.
3 -- Even facilities that are net beneficial to society are able
to be stopped by a few groups perceiving the proposal to be
net costly.*
How might negotiations and compensation address these issues?
Negotiations and compensation will not change the concerns of
various groups and individuals. Instead, negotiations allow these
concerns to surface and be considered in facility planning. Compensation
repays those costs making a facility net costly to some parties. Just
as in barter economies, negotiations allow parties to an exchange to
actually participate in the exchange. Compensation places values on
attributes of the exchanged goods and lets these values be reflected in
the facility's final price. When a facility is no longer net costly
to various individuals and groups, the rationale for opposition no
longer exists. Thus, facilities which are net beneficial to society
when all costs are considered will be sited.
The additional criticisms that the current siting process is
inefficient, unfair and causes further demoralization costs, are
* For a detailed explanation of how various groups and individuals have
acquired standing to sue and other leverage making them influential
in the siting process, see Alan C. Weinstein, "Legal Barriers to
Energy Facility Development." [13]
Briefly, several legislated avenues exist for individuals and groups
to attack and potentially halt a project. The National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) with its Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
requirement, contains significant intervention powers for concerned
groups. Similarly, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the Clean Air
Act, state environmental quality acts, state power plant siting
legislation and state and local land-use regulations all provide means
for concerned groups and individuals to actively respond to proposed
facilities.
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overcome when compensation and negotiation are incorporated into the
process. Compensation forces developers to realize the total costs
of proposed facilities. Thus, the efficient, cost-minimizing site will
theoretically be selected. Negotiations and compensation are "fair"
since they involve affected parties in the process and repay those
adversely affected for society's benefit. Finally, compensation payments
undermine demoralization costs. Individuals currently making "second-
best" choices to avoid potentially uncompensated losess will be able
to make the "best" choice knowing that compensation will be paid when
losses are incurred.
The intent of incorporating negotiations, and therefore compensation,
into the siting process is not to increase the costs of siting facilities.
Instead, the intent is to promote an accounting of the full costs of
facility development, thereby including those currently left external
to this process. Compensation and negotiation allow all parties to an
exchange to participate in this exchange and assure that their interests
are considered when developing the "price" of the "goods" exchanged.
Each agreement will obviously differ according to the particular
community and individuals involved since specific values and concerns
addressed in making any exchange will vary.
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The Absence of Compensation & Negotiation: Some Hypotheses
Given the apparent desirability of compensation and negotiation
in siting energy facilities, why do we not more frequently observe
their use? Several hypotheses can be developed in response to this
question even before undertaking empirical case analyses.
The nature of negotiations, as well as barter economies, have
been studied extensively. [5,11,14] These studies emphasize two major
prerequisites to successful negotiations:
1 -- Before negotiations will occur, parties to a conflict
must possess "something to trade." Parties without
something to trade will have no leverage to influence
the negotiations.
2 -- Even should all parties possess "something to trade,"
negotiations will not occur if parties to the conflict do
not perceive "something to gain" in so doing (or, conversely,
"something to lose" in not negotiating). If the outcome
of negotiations will not make an individual or group better
off than the perceived outcome without negotiations, then the
rational approach is not to negotiate.
Additionally, aspects of the current siting process indicate
other reasons why, compensation and negotiation may not be readily used:
1 -- Because negotiations and compensation are not established
characteristics of the current siting process, people may
not realize that this option exists. Developers seldom
view compensation as a cost-minimizing step in siting
facilities. Concerned groups are accustomed to adversarial
responses to proposed facilities.
2 -- Because they are seldom used, people do not know how to
proceed with negotiations or how to incorporate compensation
into the process.
Chapters II and III present and analyze two case studies of
proposed energy facilities. The two case differ in many respects. The
Grayrocks Dam conflict in Wyoming is of inter-state and national
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concern. The Montague Nuclear Power Plant conflict in Massachusetts,
at least at this stage, is of only local and regional concern. The
important actors and decision-makers* differ between the two cases.
Additionally, the Grayrocks Dam case illustrates a more traditional
'"environmental" controversy since the main object of contention was
an endangered species. Montague, on the other hand, depicts a conflict
involving a community and region's social, physical and economic well-
being. Finally, the Grayrocks Dam case is complete; it follows the
full range of steps from proposal announcement through negotiations
to a final consensus by all parties. Montague has not reached completion.
At present, the utility has postponed construction and suspended site
review for financial reasons. As a result, this case does not present
a complete overview of the siting process and decision-making from
start to finish. Instead, it gives insight into the detail of several
interchanges between parties to the conflict and specifically how
and why they chose particular approaches to address their needs and
influence decisions. These differences make the two cases incomparable
yet complimentary in exploring the infrequent use of negotiations and
compensation in the siting process.
* All persons participating in a siting process are "actors" in that
process. For the purposes of this paper, an "official" decision
is one made by a formal government in accordance with its legislated
responsibilities. For example, "official" decisions in the siting
process include permit approvals by local, state and federal agencies
and governments charged with different aspects of facility review.
"Decision-makers" herein refer to those making "official" decisions
even though all "actors," in a sense, are decision-makers in that they
actively make choices in responding to a proposal and participating
in the process.
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CHAPTER II
THE GRAYROCKS DAM CONFLICT
Introduction
Two conflicts make the proposed Grayrocks Dam near Wheatland,
Wyoming, instructive in understanding compensation and negotiation
and their potential role in energy facility sitings. First is an
interstate water rights dispute between Nebraska and Wyoming over North
Platte River water to be consumed by the facility. The second conflict
arises between conservationists and the utilities over potential
harm to the endangered Whooping Crane species downstream from the
proposed dam.
Negotiations and compensation were successfully applied in this
siting case. Before achieving success, though, several obstacles
had to be overcome. This case illustrates why parties to a conflict
adopted different strategies during different phases of the siting
process. Further, it indicates the consequences of various strategies
on process outcomes.
Questions that help to analyze compensation and negotiation in
this case are:
-- How did different parties to the conflict acquire and use
bargaining leverage?
-- How did perceived leverage change during the course of the
conflict?
-- What role did uncertainty play in influencing strategies by
different parties?
-- Why were negotiations more successful at later stages of the
conflict than earlier ones?
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-- What relationships developed between different parties to
the conflicts and why?
-- How were compensation offers derived?
-- How were compensation offers received?
-- How was the final agreement perceived by participants in
the negotiations?
-- What would be the expected outcome should parties not have
chosen to negotiate?
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Background
The Missouri Basin Power Project (MBPP) is a consortium of
six utilities currently constructing a $1.6 billion coal-fired power
plant on the Laramie River, a tributary of the North Platte River,
near Wheatland, Wyoming. MBPP was formed in 1970 in response to
heavy industrial power requirements forecasted for the utilities'
service area: eastern Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa and Minnesota (figure 1). The six
utilities were each experiencing increasing energy demands and
viewed a combined effort as the expedient approach to meet this
demand. Siting difficulties and cost considerations made individual
efforts less efficient. The electricity generated by this facility
will serve two million customers in the eight state area. [13a]
The facility has two main components: a coal-fired plant
(50% completed) and an adjacent reservoir and dam supplying cooling
water for this plant. The Grayrocks Dam, behind which the new
reservoir will form, became embroiled in controversy involving several
parties with varying interests:
-- The state of Wyoming (Wyoming) favored the project because
of its economic benefits: jobs, economic growth,
electricity for rural Wyoming, and irrigation water. [1, 5]
-- The state of Nebraska (Nebraska) opposed the project. It
felt Wyoming would consume more than its share of North Platte
River water with this project and that Nebraska's water needs
would suffer as a result. [3]
-- Conservation groups (National Audubon Society, National Wildlife
Federation, Nebraska Wildlife Federation, Powder River Basin
Resource Council and Laramie River Conservation Council) were
concerned that the plant's water use would endanger wildlife
along the North Platte River, especially the endangered
Whooping Crane. [1, 4]
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FIGURE 1
MISSOURI BASIN POWER PROJECT
COMBINED- SERVICE AREA
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-- The Rural Electrification Association of Nebraska (REAN) favors
the facility since it stands to benefit from the power
generated. [3]
-- The six MBPP utilities obviously favor continued plant
construction. [5, 8]
It is the conflict among these parties, and its gradual resolution,
that will be recounted and analyzed in this chapter.
Federal Involvement
In addition to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), the federal government was involved in the Grayrocks Dam
conflict through three agencies.
The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS)
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, within the Department of the
Interior, is charged with, among other things, administering and
enforcing the Endangered Species Act of 1973. This Act requires that
federal agencies:
1 -- use their authority to carry out programs to protect any
species designated as an endangered species;
2 -- consult with the Office of Endangered Species of the USFWS
whenever their actions may jeopardize an endangered species;
and,
3 -- ensure that their actions do not endanger or jeopardize
designated species. This requirement is accomplished by
either not issuing the requested permits or by mitigating
potential impacts. [6]
Section 7, the requirement that consultation must occur between
the federal agency and the USFWS Office of Endangered Species, became
an issue with the Grayrocks Dam proposal. The endangered Whooping
Crane occupies a section of the North Platte River in Nebraska and
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could be affected by diminished water flow in the river. The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers' 404 dredge-fill permit and the Rural
Electrification Administration's loan guarantees, are both federal
actions requiring consultation with the USFWS. [6]
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Under Section 404 of the Federal Clean Water Act, the Army Corps
is required to review any request to place dredge and fill material
in a U.S. waterway. [2] When MBPP wanted to begin Grayrocks Dam
construction, it applied to the Army Corps for this 404 permit.
Although the endangered species habitat along the North Platte River
had not yet been designated as critical, the designation process was
underway. Regardless, under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act,
the Army Corps was required to enter into consultation with the USFWS
about potential impacts on the habitat and crane. [6]
The Army Corps did begin consultation with the Office of Endangered
Species. It was told, though, that the USFWS had inadequate information
and would need approximately three years to do sufficient research
before the impact of the dam could be determined. A hearing was held
at the Wheatland, Wyoming, project site. The Army Corps then made
their own determination that there would be no impact and issued the
404 permit. [2]
The Rural Electrification Administration (REA)
The REA gives loan guarantees to small electrical companies
or cooperatives delivering power to rural areas in the U.S. It
had guaranteed loans to the MBPP without entering into consultation
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with the USFWS as directed under Section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act. The USFWS had contacted the REA twice, informing it of this
requirement, but the REA never responded. The USFWS never commenced
action against the REA on this account since conservation groups were
already doing so. [6]
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
NEPA also played a role in the Grayrocks Dam controversy. The
EIS required by NEPA was attacked as inadequate on several accounts
by conservation groups and Nebraska. These allegations led to several
court suits and, eventually, encouraged negotiations to avoid
extended and costly court battles.
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The Issues
The North Platte River Ecosystem
During the past 50 years, 43 dams and numerous irrigation projects
have diminished streamflow in the North Platte River by almost 70%.
The Missouri Basin Power Project facility will consume an additional
60,000 acre feet of water each year to satisfy cooling needs.
Conservationists fear that this additional reduction in streamflow
will be "the straw that breaks the camel's back" in its effect on North
Platte River wildlife habitats. [13a]
The conservationists centered their concerns on the endangered
Whooping Crane's critical habitat. Located on the North Platte River
in central Nebraska, the habitat is 270 miles downstream from the
Grayrocks Dam. It serves as a major stopover on the flyway between
the Aransas National Wildlife Refuge in Texas and the Wood Buffalo
National Park in Canada (figure 2). This critical habitat consists
of a 60-mile long stretch of sandbars. Flood waters and ice from the
annual snow melt have historically scoured the sandbars and kept them
free of vegetation. [11] If streamflow along the North Platte recedes
to the extent that this scouring will no longer occur, vegetation will
overcome the sandbars and make them unsuitable for the Whooping Crane
and other wildlife currently using them. The project's water use,
conservationists contend, may diminish the river flow beyond this
critical level.
Although the conservation groups are concerned about wildlife in
general along the North Platte, they are focussing their efforts on
the Whooping Crane. The crane is protected by the Endangered Species
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FIGURE 2
WHOOPING CRANE HABITAT & FLYWAY
Xy Dave Cook--The WhAsitoPos
Brken line indicates route of the whooping eine's annual migration.
SOURCE: The Washington Post
November 27, 1978
M
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Act and therefore gives the groups a strong legal position in
negotiations with MBPP officials. Specifically, groups can sue to
enjoin project construction should it threaten the Whooping Crane.
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in the Tellico Dam case gives
groups a high probability of stopping all construction provided they
can demonstrate this harm to the endangered species. Additionally,
the conservationists are taking advantage of NEPA's EIS requirement
to gain further intervention leverage. They contested the adequacy of
the EIS in addressing North Platte River habitats and the Whooping
Crane.
Water Rights
The water rights issue in the western United States is very
complex. Water rights to Laramie River and North Platte River waters
have been contested on several occasions. In 1945 and in 1956 the
U.S. Supreme Court issued rulings delimiting how water is to be
distributed among the three states (Colorado, Wyoming, Nebraska)
common to the two waterways, respectively. [3, 8] All three states
seem to interpret these decrees differently, though. [5] To complicate
the issue, each state has developed its own way of reallocating waters
perceived as its own. Since these western states are so arid, each
has irrigation districts that allocate water to farmers and ranchers,
ideally in a manner that maximizes the crop return for water consumed.
These districts form large networks of farmers and ranchers who are
able to buy and sell "water rights" under supervision and approval of
the irrigation boards in their districts. [5]
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Project officials feel that Nebraska interprets the Supreme
Court's rulings in a light most beneficial to Nebraska's interests. [8]
Since Nebraska is furthest downstream of the three states, it has
been taking advantage of its share of the water plus whatever was
left over from upstream users. As a result, when the Grayrocks Dam
was proposed, Nebraska feared they would no longer be able to use the
same amount of water previously claimed.
Project officials believe the conservation groups "have a
larger quarrel" with Nebraska than with the Grayrocks Dam and MBPP. [5]
Edward Weinberg, MBPP counsel, asserts that Nebraska has been the most
inconsiderate user of North Platte River water. He believes that the
Grayrocks Dam will affect the Whooping Crane little compared with
Nebraska's water consumption. [5] William Wisdom, attorney for
Basin Electric (major interest-holders in the MBPP), points out that
the Kingsley Dam, located on the North Platte River in Nebraska
between the critical habitat and the Grayrocks Dam site, has a 2.1
million acre feet reservoir. He emphasizes that "this dam has
absolutely no provisions for wildlife or conservation of water use
in its operations at all."* [8]
* The Kingsley Dam and Lake McConaughy Reservoir are entirely
privately-owned and operated. As there is no federal involvement
in the operation and maintenance of this dam and reservoir, its
water use could not be considered when determining impacts upon
the Whooping Crane. Originally, MBPP officials and the Army
Corps were asserting that the McConaughy Reservoir would be able
to offset any water loss by the Grayrocks Dam. [8]
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Nebraska, on the other hand, feels that the Supreme Court ruling
allocated 75% of North Platte waters to Nebraska.* It felt that the
project's reservoir was too big given the power plant's needs and
that water consumption by the plant could be diminished substantially.
Further, Paul Snyder, assistant Attorney General for Nebraska, points
out that the project is creating a new irrigation district in addition
to the dam and reservoir that will further consume North Platte River
water before it enters Nebraska. [3]
Informal Negotiations
Interplay between these interests began in 1973 when the MBPP
established an Environmental Advisory Committee to explore potential
environmental impacts of the Grayrocks Dam. [4] It solicited input
from concerned environmental groups yet, according to Robert Turner,
Wyoming representative of the National Audubon Society, the project
officials response to committee advice and recommendations was
"negative in every regard." The committee suggested that a smaller
plant would supply power needs with less environmental impact. MBPP
officials disagreed and disbanded the committee in 1976. Turner
feels that project representatives were generally unsympathetic to
the needs of wildlife along the North Platte and saw no need to make
concessions for wildlife protection. [4]
* The Supreme Court rulings, because they are vague in calculating
river water availability and relative needs, leave a certain
degree of interpretation and discretion up to the individual
state. As a result, the states still contest the precise distribution
of rights to Laramie and North Platte River waters. [12b]
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Informal negotiations began occurring at this point between
the MBPP and conservation groups, as well as between the MBPP and
Nebraska. [4,8] Both interests were trying to convince the utilities
to alter their proposal by decreasing water use and including measures
to protect the Whooping Crane.*
Nebraska and MBPP officials met almost thirty times over the
course of the conflict to discuss their differences. [5] William
Wisdom asserts that specific water flows were discussed in these
negotiations but that Nebraska would never agree to the levels
offered. [8] Paul Snyder, on the other hand, feels that MBPP
officials were never willing to concede anything in these negotiating
sessions. His impression throughout was that MBPP officials were
convinced that Nebraska "did not know what they were talking about."
Snyder believes these sessions were nothing more than "game-playing"
by the MBPP. He asserts that the MBPP was continually telling various
officials different stories about what could or could not be done to
alter project plans. [3]
Snyder feels the real reason project officials were not eager
to seriously negotiate at first was because they believed they had
'political clout" that could be used to undermine any lawsuits
threatened by Nebraska. These utilities were well known in their
* No one was able to recall specifically which group initiated these
negotiations. From my interviews with representatives of most groups,
it seems probable that Nebraska and conservation group representatives
originally approached MBPP officials when they determined cause for
concern with project plans. When court suits became a fact instead
of a threat, it is likely that MBPP officials in turn initiated
further negotiation efforts.
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service areas and had always received cooperation from state and
local officials. Snyder notes that "nobody had ever stood up to
them before"; they were "used to getting away with whatever they
proposed." [3]
Similar reactions were expressed by the conservation groups.
Throughout discussions between these groups and MBPP representatives,
the utilities seemed unwilling to seriously consider measures directed
towards protecting the Whooping Crane. Turner believes that the MBPP
was in essence telling the conservation groups to "go ahead and sue
us' as they seemed confident that the conservationists "could never
win the suit." [4]
It is likely that the MBPP's confidence during these discussions
arose from activities in Washington, D.C., where retiring Rep. Teno
Roncalio (D-Wyo) was completing his final term. Pleading:
"Do you want to send me back to Wyoming, after
ten years as your friend and colleague, to face
2,000 unemployed people in Wheatland on account
of a totally unjustified thing like this, the
Endangered Species Act?", [13a]
Roncalio convinced the House to pass a bill exempting the Missouri
Basin Power Project from all federal requirements. When the bill
moved on to the Senate Conference Committee, it was altered substantially
to exempt the project solely from the Endangered Species Act. Further-
more, this exemption was only to be valid if the newly-established
Endangered Species Committee decides so after considering the issue
"expeditiously."* [13a]
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Litigation
Intervening groups would rather have avoided the time and
expense involved in fighting the MBPP in court. Since informal
negotiations had failed to remove the need for courtsuits, this
approach remained the only alternative to having their concerns realized
and acted upon. Using their only leverage -- NEPA and the Endangered
Species Act -- the conservation groups and Nebraska took the MBPP
to court.
The first lawsuit involving the Grayrocks Dam was filed in 1976
by Nebraska against the REA. [3] Nebraska alleged that the REA's
loans to the MBPP were illegal on the grounds that the project had
an inadequate EIS. Nebraska filed a second suit against the Army
Corps alleging that the Corps had issued its 404 dredge-fill permit
when the project, again, had an inadequate EIS. Nebraska asserted
* When the Endangered Species Act came up for extension in Congress in
November, 1978, it was attacked as being inflexible. As a condition
to extending the Act, Congress established the Endangered Species
Committee. This committee is to review "irreconciliable conflicts"
involving endangered species that are unable to be resolved through
the Act's provisions. The committee is to grant exemptions for
projects that otherwise fall under the Endangered Species Act "only
if it concluded that the public interest is best served by completing
the project, that no reasonable and prudent alternatives exist, and
that the project's benefits clearly outweigh the benefits of any
alternative courses of action which would conserve the species or
its criticAl habitat." [10,14]
Any settlement in the Grayrocks case must be conditioned on the
approval of this committee. The Endangered Species Committee never
ruled on this exemption. By the time the committee had its first
meeting on January 23, 1979, an agreement between all parties in the
Grayrocks conflict had been reached so that the exemption was a moot
point. The committee then simply ratified this agreement, thereby
exempting the project from the Endangered Species Act for as long as
the agreement was upheld.
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that the EIS was inadequate because it said "nothing" about impacts
upon the state of Nebraska's irrigation and municipal water needs nor
about the impacts upon the aquatic ecosystem along the North Platte
River as it flows through Nebraska. [3] Several other lawsuits were
filed by the conservation groups, again citing an inadequate EIS in
addition to a failure to fulfill the requirements of the Endangered
Species Act. [4]
All suits were consolidated and all plaintiffs and defendants to
original suits were joined to the consolidated suit. As the lawsuit
proceeded, some attempts were made by the two sides to negotiate but
little progress resulted. [1,3] Both parties felt confident of winning
the suit and negotiations therefore seemed unwarranted by both sides.
Given the impasse, the court issued its ruling. The court enjoined
the project from proceeding, the REA from issuing loan guarantees to
the MBPP, and the Army Corps from issuing the 404 dredge-fill permit. [3]
It was at this point, Snyder notes, that "the real negotiations
started!" [3]
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Formal Negotiations
MBPP officials appealed the court's decision and felt confident
the injunction would be reversed. Nevertheless, Edward Weinberg,
attorney for the MBPP, noted that it was still in their best interest
to proceed with negotiations, even given the "probable" court reversal.
The appeal would take time; project officials estimated they would
be in court a full year. They estimated further that they could lose
close to $500 million if construction were delayed for this amount of
time. The MBPP's immediate concern, therefore, was to settle
differences as soon as possible so as to proceed with the halted
construction. Reaching a quick settlement seemed to be the expedient
approach given the time and money expected to be consumed by an
appeal process. [5]
The conservation groups also agreed to negotiate even though it
seemed that they had everything leaning in their favor. Turner
(National Audubon Society) explains that they did not want to "win
the lawsuit but lose the issue." His organization believes it is
"better to resolve a conflict without a lawsuit." They saw in this
conflict a potential for resolution and chose to negotiate rather than
wait for the court appeal outcome. [4] Patrick Parenteau, attorney
for the National Wildlife Federation, commented that it "is a good
project from an environmental standpoint," and that the National
Wildlife Federation (NWF) was not seeking to permanently stop its
construction. Rather, they wanted to see some modifications to it such
that the Whooping Crane would be protected. Parenteau does not
believe that any of the intervenors were set on completely halting the
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project. He asserts that intervenors wanted "accomodation" such that
environmental concerns would be addressed sufficiently to protect
the crane's critical habitat. [1]
The uncertain outcome of the Endangered Species Committee meeting
on whether or not to exempt the project from the Endangered Species
Act also undoubtedly influenced these groups to negotiate rather than
prolong court battles. Neither group could feel confident about the
committee's ruling since the committee had never met to resolve any
issue.
The formal negotiations leading to a final settlement occurred
during three meetings: one in Lincoln, Nebraska, in mid-October, 1978,
and two in Cheyenne, Wyoming, on November 2-3, 1978. Snyder describes
these negotiations as having "come about in a strange way." MBPP
officials had maintained contact with REAN and other groups favoring
the proposed plant and dam. While these people were not parties to
any of the lawsuits, they stood to benefit by the project and were
concerned about the outcome of the dispute. The MBPP sent these people
as intermediaries to Wyoming and Nebraska's attorney generals to inquire
whether or not they would be willing to negotiate now. Both states
agreed, as did the conservation groups. [3]
Lincoln Meeting
The first meeting in Lincoln was more symbolic than a serious
negotiating session. Patrick Parenteau believes that, to a large
extent, the two states used these meetings for "political posturing"
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purposes as elections were forthcoming and state water rights were at
stake. [1] About 60 persons participated in the first meeting in
Lincoln with the two governors serving as co-chairmen. The participants
included representatives of all parties to the lawsuits, several
Nebraska and Wyoming government officials, MBPP officials and
representatives of the REAN. [8] In this meeting, the parties
determined that it was possible for them to reach an agreement and that
they should meet and formally negotiate later. They selected six
persons to participate in these formal negotiations whom they felt
reflected the divergent interests involved. These six were: Nebraska's
attorney general, Nebraska's Director of Water Resources, Basin Electric's
James Grahl, MBPP attorney Edward Weinberg, Patrick Parenteau of the
National Wildlife Federation and David Pomerly of the Nebraska
Wildlife Federation. They were instructed to immediately develop and
distribute their "bottom-line proposals" which would form the basis
for the negotiations. [8] Although no negotiations per se occurred
in Lincoln, all parties seemed pleased-with the progress that was
made towards negotiation there.
Cheyenne Meeting
When the next meeting commenced a few weeks later in Cheyenne,
the six participants were accompanied by their technical advisors and
legal counsel. Immediately, participants realized that the size of
the group was unwie.ldly and was leading to little progress. Thus,
they devised a different approach. Advisors and counsel assembled
in an adjacent room while the six representatives met as a closed
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group to discuss the essence of their differences and where possible
concessions could be made. Whenever one of the negotiators had a
question he could simply leave the negotiations and consult with his
experts. There was no mediator or arbiter presiding over these
negotiations. Use of a third party was never actually considered
by the participants. They felt negotiations could be successful
without such outside help since all parties wanted the conflict to
be resolved. [8]
At the end of two days of negotiations, the parties had agreed
to-a 21-point settlement. Thirty days later, a formal, binding
agreement had been drawn together and signed by all parties.
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The Settlement
Although the settlement has 21 points of agreement, these can
be categorized into two general accords:
1 -- a $7.5 million trust fund for protection of the Whooping
Crane, and
2 -- minimum streamflow levels that vary for different seasons
during the year for the North Platte River.
Before the Wyoming negotiations, MBPP officials decided to
offer $15 million to the intervening groups. [8] This money was to
be used by the conservationists and Nebraska to purchase water rights
to maintain whatever streamflow level was thought appropriate.
Additionally, some money could be used to artificially protect the
Whooping Crane's critical habitat. MBPP officials derived the
$15 million value through calculations of how much they could afford
to pay, how much they could potentially lose if a settlement was not
reached and approximately what amount the concerned parties would need
to satisfy their needs. [8] No one was able to recall the specific
formula used to obtain this value, though.
The MBPP presented the $15 million offer to participants in the
Cheyenne negotiations. The money was rejected for several reasons.
Nebraska wanted a guaranteed streamflow through the state and did not
feel assured by this offer that it would be obtained. Moreover,
Nebraska officials viewed money offers as "very suspect." Snyder
comments that Nebraska realized the negotiations were constantly in
the public's eye and, as a result, it wanted to make sure that the
"state of Nebraska was not given any money except legal fees."
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Nebraska wanted to be sure that the money did not appear to be a
"payoff to Nebraska." [3]
The conservation groups also wanted guaranteed minimum streamflows.
They were unsure how successful maintaining specific streamflow
levels could be through water rights purchases. Guaranteed streamflows
would make their efforts to protect the Whooping Crane's habitat
more likely to succeed.* [1,4]
When the $15 million offer was rejected, project officials
met to develop their next offer. The second offer halved the
money to $7.5 million and provided several water concessions. [8]
Discussions involving the $7.5 million offer were not as directed
as those occurring over water use. Since water levels were the
major contention, the offer of money caught Nebraska and the
conservation groups by surprise. [1,3] Never did they discuss the
value of $7.5 million versus, for example, $7 million or $8 million.
* In Nebraska, as in several western states, water is allocated by
the state to users only if it will be put to a "beneficial use."
"Beneficial uses" include agriculture, mining, municipal water needs,
recreation, and the maintenance and propagation of fish and wildlife.
The intent behind the $15 million offer was that this money could
be spent purchasing water rights and artificially protecting the
Whooping Crane's habitat. It seems at face value that this would
legitimately fall under the "maintenance and propagation of fish
and wildlife" intention. There is a catch in western water law,
though, which states that any "beneficial use" must entail "physical
removal of the water from the stream." [ll,12a,12b] The Wildlife
Management Institute, a privately-funded scientific organization
devoted to the restoration and improved management of wildlife,
asserts that the only way money will be useful in boosting stream
flows is if the negotiators can "change Nebraska state law." [7,11]
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service believes that there are "ways to
get around these restrictions." The fact that Nebraska was
participating in the negotiations led participants to believe that
there would be no problems with purchasing water rights to be left
in the river. [4]
- 41 -
As a result, they never determined that $7.5 million was the appropriate
amount of money to protect the Whooping Crane.
Both groups were hesitant to discuss receipt of money as part
of any agreement. Nebraska feared that it would appear as though it
was "selling out" to the utilities for money and thus not upholding
the best interests of its citizens [3] The National Wildlife Federation
did not feel it could fulfill its raison d'etre without risking its
reputation if it accepted money from the utilities. [1] Given these
hesitations, participants began discussing alternative means of
addressing the Whooping Crane's needs. They did not want to subject
Nebraska and the conservation groups to public misconceptions. It
was at this point that Patrick Parenteau devised the trust fund idea. [1]
Paul Snyder emphasized that it was the development of this "independent"
trust fund with a separate board of trustees that made the final
settlement acceptable to Nebraska. [3]
This "change in name" of the $7.5 million offer assured that the
money would actually be used for its designated purposes and thus
removed appearances of misconduct by Nebraska or the conservation
groups. The trust fund is established for perpetuity. Its yearly
interest will be invested in protective measures for the Whooping
Cranes and their habitat. [11] The settlement is a legally-binding
contract, signed by all parties to the negotiations. It has a
monitoring stipulation included to assure implementation of its
provisions. [9]
- 42 -
Analysis
Several problems precluding the application of negotiations
and compensation to the siting process became apparent in the Grayrocks
case. These problems validate the hypotheses set forth in Chapter I
and illuminate other obstacles not able to be predicted by Chapter I's
theoretical presentation.
Prerequisites for Negotiation
The Grayrocks case illustrates the importance of parties to a
conflict perceiving something to be gained or to be lost should
negotiations not occur. While all parties did possess bargaining
leverage as noted in the case presentation, it was not until the
uncertainty posed by the Endangered Species Committee's eventual
ruling that they perceived each could possibly be worse off without
than with negotiations. They chose to negotiate when they realized
that not negotiating could possibly lead to an outcome which would be
less desirable.
The extent and success of negotiations with Grayrocks followed
closely the shifting leverage by different parties throughout the
process. It was not until all groups possessed this crucial "something
to trade" that negotiated compromise was viewed to be in everyone's
best interests. The utility's bargaining leverage included the fact
that the project was going to increase the region's energy resources,
provide irrigation water to Wyoming for agricultural expansion, provide
jobs and economic development stimulus, and tax revenues to Platte
County, Wyoming. Further, the utilities had money and expertise
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resources which could be used as potential means of compensation.
Nebraska and conservation groups also possessed bargaining leverage.
They had a court victory leaning in their favor and felt confident the
appeal would not overturn the earlier court decision. They had the
potential absolute power of the Endangered Species Act, should the
Endangered Species Committee rule in their favor. Further they could
continue to impose costly delays which the MBPP wanted to avoid.
Thus, in the Grayrocks Dam case, the conflict reached the point wherein
all parties possessed the means and the desire to negotiate. Negotiations
therefore occurred and were successful.
It is only obvious that the MBPP would rather not have had to
negotiate. When faced with costly delays due to litigation by
Nebraska and the conservation groups, they are pleased that the settlement
allowed them to get on with their work at a lesser cost than would
drawn-out court battles. Basin Electric Power Cooperative general
counsel, William Wisdom, provides the following analogy of his
company's reaction to the settlement:
A young man, walking along a street in his hometown,
encounters an elderly gentleman who is an old family
friend. The young man asks congenially, "How are you
enjoying your old age?", to which the elderly gentle-
man can do little more than reply, "When I think about
the alternatives, just fine!" [8]
The MBPP would much rather not have to pay the $7.5 million nor
concede to reduced water consumption, but, given the delays and
costs inherent in other approaches to gaining approval to restart
construction, the settlement was quite attractive.
Similarly, conservation groups viewed negotiations and a settlement
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as a more desirable alternative to extended litigation. While it
is true that these conservation groups, like the utilities, were
uncertain about the Endangered Species Committee ruling, they also did
not have the resources to continue in a court battle.
The Structure of the Siting Process
The Grayrocks Dam conflict also pointed to characteristics of
the siting process, as currently structured, which encourage litigation
and hinder negotiations. No framework exists in the siting process
into which negotiations and compensation can easily be incorporated.
Instead, concerned groups had to circumvent the process and undertake
negotiations outside established channels. The siting process, with
its specific requirements which do not include negotiations and
compensation, directed all interests into adversarial positions
wherein their strategic responses were dictated by what was acceptable
in a court of law.
For example, Dr. Keith Harmon of the Wildlife Management Institute,
commented on Nebraska's strategies before the Grayrocks formal
negotiations:
"The position of the state of Nebraska is clear.
The Whooping Crane, on the state's part, was used
as a vehicle to legally force the release of flows
from the Grayrocks Project for use in Nebraska.
That use will be for agricultural irrigation, not
cranes, once it enters the state. During
testimony on Grayrocks, the State conceded that
Platte River flows had never been reserved for
Whooping Cranes." [11]
Bob Turner noted that Nebraska was much more interested in water for
irrigation purposes than to protect the endangered Whooping Crane.
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He saw Nebraska's involvement as a bitter inter-state battle for water
rights with Wyoming. He commented that the endangered species issue
was a "convenient vehicle" for them to address their concerns as they
had no other alternatives. Turner stressed that the Endangered Species
Act was a "handle everyone could grasp," and they did. [4] Paul
Snyder readily admits that Nebraska had "no force or legal standing
to influence any decisions" in the Grayrocks case. All they could
really do was present testimony at open hearings unless they addressed
procedural issues via NEPA and the Endangered Species Act. [3] The
latter approach was the one chosen as it held the most promise for
getting their concerns realized and acted upon.
Perceptions of Negotiations & Compensation
The surprised reaction to and immediate rejection of the first
$15 million offer illustrates that money offers are viewed with
suspicion. While the water flow levels were also compensation to
affected parties, this compensation was not monetary and was directed
specifically at the major concern: minimum water flows in the North
Platte River. The legitimacy of water level concessions was never
questionned. Not until the $15 million was reduced to $7.5 million and
labelled a "trust fund" instead of "money" was it accepted.
Paul Snyder emphasizes that the trust fund is "independent"
and therefore "not a bribery." [3] A public figure, especially in
this post-Watergate era, has much to lose if his constituency perceive
his actions as illegal or unethical. Since negotiations and compensation
offers such as these were seldom observed, Snyder logically feared
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their legitimacy would be overrun with misconceptions and bribery
charges by the public. Although the intent of the $7.5 million
trust fund was clear, both Nebraska and the conservation groups
feared that it would not also be clear to their constituencies.
When this "unlabeled" money was given the title "trust fund," though,
it was accepted more readily even though applied to the same needs
and purposes; all that had changed was its name and assurances that
it would be used for the specified purpose.
A Qualified Success
Negotiations succeeded in the Grayrocks case because they
led to consensus by all parties. Two factors make this a qualified
success, though. First, the negotiations were not perceived as
appropriate nor as addressing the "real" issues by some participants.
Second, while compensation was part of the final agreement, discussions
did not center upon the compensation to be paid or whether or not
the amount was correct. Instead, discussions focussed on whether or
not the offer would be accepted by Nebraska and the conservation groups.
Negotiations are viewed as a qualified success because parties
to the conflict are not in agreement that the nature of the outcome
or the actual negotiations were meaningful to the issues of concern.
The National Audubon Society feels the settlement is "excellent"
because it is now forcing the utilities to pay "economically what it
is costing" to construct this plant. Turner feels that the payment
and concessions are "directed at the facility's environmental impacts"
and therefore are legitimate compensation. He further emphasizes
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that "it was not a bribery"; it "was the right thing for the utilities
to do." [4]
While Nebraska's Paul Snyder simply comments that Nebraska "got
what they wanted," [3] Basin Electric's general counsel Bill Wisdom
believes that this settlement "didn't have a damn thing to do with
the issues; all we did was buy a lawsuit." [8] Edward Weinberg,
MBPP attorney, feels that the utilities got the "bum end" of the deal.
He saw the negotiations as "the constructive thing to do" but the
settlement as misdirected with the time, effort and concessions not
meaningful to the real issues. [5]
Thus, while the negotiations can be labeled a success because
they ended in a signed, binding agreement, this consensus does not
also encompass the legitimacy of the negotiations which occurred
nor the contents of discussions therein.
The second reason the success is a qualified one is that, while
compensation was paid via water flow agreements and the trust fund,
discussions failed to center on the exact value of the trust fund
and whether or not this $7.5 million was the appropriate amount to
be paid, not just the appropriate means of compensation to settle
their differences. Discussions surrounding the water flow concessions
were much more directed.
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Summary
In summary, the Grayrocks case highlights several obstacles
hindering the application of negotiations and compensation to the
siting process. Knowledge of these problems will give direction
to policy-makers intent on improving the siting process through
use of these two tools. Mdst importantly, though, the Grayrocks
case illustrates that compensation and negotiation can be used
successfully.
Important points raised in the Grayrocks Dam conflict presentation
and analysis include:
1 -- Before negotiations will proceed, parties to a conflict
must possess "something to trade."
2 -- Further, before negotiations will proceed, parties to the
conflict must perceive something to be gained via negotiations
or, conversely, something to be lost should negotiations
not occur.
3 -- The siting process, as structured, does not easily accomodate
negotiations or compensation agreements.
4 -- Compensation offers, especially when taking the form of
money, are viewed with suspicion and rejected. Parties to
a conflict fear that such offers give appearances of
being "bought off" or "selling out" to the developer.
5 -- Compensation must be directed at specific impacts and
the amount and type of compensation must be specifically
negotiated. Without these measures, compensation offers
create confusion and are viewed as illegitimate.
6 -- Traditional expectations of the siting process do not
include negotiations between affected parties. Instead,
the process directs parties to the conflict into adversarial
roles most often involving court battles.
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CHAPTER III
THE PROPOSED MONTAGUE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
Introduction
The Montague case, unlike the Grayrocks Dam conflict, does not
proceed to completion. Total state and federal agency involvement
never occurred. Conflicting interests were never able to resolve
their differences. Negotiations did not succeed and offers of
compensation were rejected. The utility postponed construction dates
on three occasions for financial reasons. The process is currently
at a standstill.
The Montague case highlights difficulties local communities
encounter when facing a proposed energy facility within their
jurisdiction. These communities possess little experience and
few resources with which to evaluate and prepare for large
scale developments. While negotiations with the developer
towards compensation agreements could ease the burden and
facilitate the siting process, such negotiations and agreements
seldom occurred. Montague's failure to resolve differences between
concerned groups lends insight into several obstacles hindering
compensation and negotiations in siting facilities. Further, the
Montague case illustrates the reaction which may be expected when
traditional expectations and attitudes of the siting process are
undermined when the concepts of negotiation and compensation are
introduced.
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Questions helpful to the Montague case analysis are:
-- What role does information, or the lack thereof, play
in the process?
-- How does risk or uncertainty influence various actors
in developing strategies in the process?
-- How was bargaining leverage distributed among different
actors?
-- How were offers of compensation calculated and received?
-- How were opportunities for negotiation perceived?
-- How did traditional expectations of the siting process
influence participant strategies?
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Background
Montague, Massachusetts, is a town of 8600 located in Franklin
County, 100 miles west of Boston. The Connecticut River flows along
its western border and separates it from Greenfield, the county seat
(figure 1).
In December, 1973, Northeast Utilities (NU) announced that
Montague was their "preferred site for twin 1150 megawatt nuclear
units," scheduled to begin operations in 1981 and 1983. This proposal
brought confusion and divisiveness to Franklin County, especially
when compensation or negotiation issues arose. Opposing views of the
project, as well as the process by which it was to be sited, led to
several factions within Montague. Those actively addressing NU's
proposed facility were:
-- the town of Montague (Board of Selectmen, Planning Board,
Airport Commission)
-- Franklin County (County Commission, County Planner)
-- towns in Franklin County (Wendell, Leverett)
-- the Massachusetts Energy Facility Siting Council
-- several intervening opposition groups
Vermont
Ashfield
ohire.
I,
FIGURE 1
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS
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Town of Montague
Montague, like the county around it, has a high unemployment
rate. Construction of NU's facility would provide employment
opportunities for many Montague and Franklin County unemployed.
Additionally, the facility would decrease Montague's tax rate
significantly during the construction period. It is estimated that the
property tax rate will drop by almost $100, yielding an eventual
rate of just $17 in 1985. [17]
Northeast Utilities is not new to Montague. Its subsidiary,
Western Massachusetts Electric Company (WMECo), has been present there
for decades. It "sold" (for $1.00) one of its unused buildings to
the town for use as a city hall, operates a hydroelectric facility there,
and pays the majority of Montague's tax revenues. [3,10,17] Montague
officials are therefore very familiar with NU officials and have
developed a strong trust relationship with them. Selectmen Chairman
William Powers classifies NU as a "friend and neighbor...not the big,
bad wolf people make them out to be." [9]
Given this trust relationship, combined with the facility's tax
benefits, Montague's Planning Board and Board of Selectmen strongly
support NU's proposal. [8,9] A vote immediately following NU's
announcement indicated 75% of Montague voters also supported the
proposal.* [9]
The Board of Selectmen and Planning Board support is significant.
The boards have permitting and rezoning power, both of which must be
* No more recent vote has been taken to reconfirm this support.
- 54 -
exercised before NU may construct and operate its units. Additionally,
these boards have power over other appointed governing bodies in Montague.
A municipal airport is located in Turners Falls, a section of
Montague near NU's proposed site. Since the facility includes two,
570-foot cooling towers, restrictions on airport use are required
by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to prevent airplane
accidents involving the towers. [12, p. 41] The Turners Falls Airport
Commission must rule on NU's request for restrictions on aircraft size
and takeoff patterns. Although a part of Montague's government, the
commission's concerns lie not with the town's unemployment profile or
coffers but instead with the continued operation and possible expansion
of the Turners Falls Airport. [6] Therefore, the commissioners are at
odds with the Board of Selectmen's support for the facility. The only
leverage the Airport Commission has over NU in this siting process is
their decision to approve or not approve NU's requested restrictions.
Franklin County
Twenty-six towns comprise rural Franklin County. It is governed
by a three-member elected county commission with various boards and
commissions serving other specific functions. New England states contain
little or no unincorporated land and, as a result, county government
is weak compared to town, city or state governments.
County Commissioners are unsure whether to support the plant
or not. On the one hand, the tax benefits to be bestowed upon Montague
warrant county support. On the other hand, other towns in Franklin
County may bear a large portion of costs during plant construction
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without also receiving a share of the tax revenue benefits. County
Planner Fred Muehl believes it is unfortunate that the development
is not a more labor-intensive one that could relieve some of the
existing unemployment in the area, especially given the capital to be
invested in the nuclear units. Additionally, although Fred Muehl is
openly opposed to nuclear power, the county commission seems to be
providing Muehl with substantial discretion in developing the county's
response to the proposal. The only leverage the county has over the
proposal is whether or not to abandon county roads through the site
for NU's benefit. [3,7]
Franklin County Towns
Towns surrounding Montague realize they will be burdened with
increasing traffic, home construction, service demands and school
enrollments should the facility be constructed. Although they are
unsure what the full extent of these impacts will be, Franklin County
towns do realize they will not share in Montague's tax benefits in
order to offset these costs. The Harbridge House report, The Social
and Economic Impact of a Nuclear Power Plant Upon Montague, Massachusetts
and the Surrounding Area (to be discussed in more detail later),
summarized the predicament in which these towns find themselves:
"Nearby towns, with no job or tax benefits to
gain and possibly some small amount of population,
jobs (and taxes) to lose may oppose the plant and
subtly resent Montague... opposition to the plant
may occur solely on the grounds that it represents
a perceived safety risk that other towns are not
willing to accept." [17, p. V-29]
This opposition is precisely what was observed around Montague. Two
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towns in the county (Wendell and Leverett) have publicly voiced
their opposition to the power plants. [7,13j] In public meetings, other
towns have discussed possible steps to addressing their concerns in the
Montague process (Northhampton and Northfield). [7] County towns
have no official decision role in the siting process and thus have
no substantive leverage over NU.
Massachusetts Energy Facility Siting Council
The Massachusetts Energy Facility Siting Council (MEFSC) was
influential in advancing negotiations in Montague. Immediately
following NU's announcement it began discussions with town and
county representatives to help them evaluate their planning needs
given NU's plans. The MEFSC encouraged both the town and county to
develop socioeconomic studies indicating potential impacts from the
plants. It further introduced the idea of a mitigation council*
into the process proceedings. [3]
Established in 1973, the MEFSC has legal jurisdiction to review
energy projects from a state-wide perspective. It is predominantly
concerned with the cost, need and environmental impacts associated
with the facility. The MEFSC believes that most power generated by
the plants will actually be used in Connecticut, not western
Massachusetts, and that other benefits from construction (jobs,
* This MEFSC idea would establish a mitigation council charged with
assuring that costs associated with the plants' construction and
operation will be borne by the "responsible" party. If adopted,
the council would be attached as a licensing condition to NU's
permits. The council will be discussed in more detail later in
this paper,.
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economic stimulus) will be short-lived and will not offset the
environmental, social and economic costs. The MEFSC favors smaller
facilities than that proposed for Montague. [3]
Other Intervenors
While several groups arose in opposition to NU's proposed
facility, none actively sought negotiations or compensation. For
the most part, these groups can be classified as "absolutist"; they
want no nuclear power plant sited in their town or county.
The Alternative Energy Coalition (AEC), New England Coalition
Against Nuclear Pollution and Sam Lovejoy voiced opposition to NU's
plans precisely because it was a proposed nuclear plant. Issues of
negotiation and compensation are not relevant to their cause --
halting the further development of nuclear power. The AEC concentrated
its efforts in educating county residents on alternatives available
to nuclear power and hoped to sway public opinion in that direction.
The New England Coalition Against Nuclear Pollution was actively
opposing the proposed Seabrook, New Hampshire, nuclear plant and thus
gave little more than their name in opposition to the Montague plants.
Sam Lovejoy, on the other hand, adopted a more active position
against NU's Montague proposal. As a co-founder of the AEC and the
Clamshell Alliance, and an official intervenor in the Montague siting
process, Lovejoy devotes himself full-time to fighting nuclear power
nationwide, with special emphasis on Montague, his home.
Although Lovejoy has no official decision role in the siting
process, he has successfully hindered NU on several occasions. He
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first knocked down NU's meteorological tower on the Montague Plains
site. He was arrested after turning himself in to the police,
charged with "willful and malicious intent to destroy property" and
was acquitted on a technicality. By filing for official intervenor
status with the NRC, he is able to participate in all formal steps in
the siting process. He hopes to hinder NU's progress by raising
procedural issues in this process. He has become a shareholder in
Northeast Utilities to assure his access to reports and documents
pertaining to NU operations and financial status. He successfully
removed the Montague town coordinator from office with conflict of
interest charges in the coordinator's association with NU. He also
became actively involved in NU's attempts to obtain "grandfather
status" to remove them from MEFSC jurisdiction. Further, Lovejoy
consulted with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission (MAC) when NU requested restrictions
on airport use in Montague. Lovejoy charged that NU was acting
improperly in requesting these restrictions and tried to convince
Airport Commissioners not to consider the request. [5]
In other words, Sam Lovejoy is, and will continue to be, violently
opposed to NU and its plans, using whatever tools he can acquire as
leverage over the utility. He is not inclined to negotiate, nor to
encourage negotiations by town or county officials. His position is
made all too clear with his comment to the Congressional Subcommittee
on Energy and the Environment:
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"...and I can tell you right now that that nuclear
power plant will not be built in Montague, no way,
no how, unless Sam Lovejoy is dead or in jail,
and it is that simple..." [16]
Compensation & Negotiation in the Montague Process
Following its announcement, NU immediately commenced siting
proceedings. It filed the appropriate dockets with the NRC, a needs
forecast with the MEFSC (not without first questioning the MEFSC's
jurisdiction over its facility) and also began formal communications
with Montague and Franklin County governments. While NU prepared for
the state and federal hearings and permitting decisions, it also began
seeking those approvals needed at the local and county levels.
NU's proposal promised many benefits to Montague and the
surrounding county but was not without its costs. While the power
generated will serve New England generally through the NEPOOL grid
(New England Power Pool*), the associated jobs, tax revenues and
economic growth will be generated in the immediate area. Accompanying
these economic benefits, the facility will bring increased home
construction, impacts on local services (fire, police, schools) and
increasing road maintenance needs from heavy traffic in addition to other
infrastructural needs. [3,7,17] The fact that the plants are proposed
* NEPOOL is a regional organization designed to "enhance the reliability
and improve the economics of bulk power supply." It was established
in 1971 by New England's utilities to take advantage of the economies
of scale inherent in regionwide planning and provision of power. The
member utilities have physically interconnected their systems so as
to coordinate planning and operations in servicing the entire New
England region. [15]
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to be nuclear powered also causes uneasiness among some local residents.
The impact on airport operations and local aesthetics from the two
570-foot cooling towers as well as the plants' transmission lines are
cause for concern. [1] Thus, Montague and Franklin County were
individually faced with evaluating these potential benefits and
relevant costs to their jurisdictions and deciding what position to
adopt in response. With the costs and benefits discussed only in
the above generalities, this evaluation proved difficult for both
governments.
A Socioeconomic Study
Once NU announced its plans for the Montague units, MEFSC
staffmembers met with county and town representatives to help them
develop a response to the proposal and a strategy for action. It
was evident from the start that neither the town nor the county were
able to fully evaluate the implications of such a large facility on
their own, but would need some outside resources and expertise.
The MEFSC urged both governments to undertake a socioeconomic study
of their respective jurisdictions to better understand the full
extent of impacts and what preparation would be needed. [3] Montague,
unable to afford such a study, presented this need to NU, and the
utility readily agreed to provide funding to the town for the study. [9]
County Planner Muehl helped Montague's Planning Board choose five
well-known research and consulting firms as potential candidates for
the assignment. These were approved by NU, and the town then selected
Harbridge House, Inc., of Boston, as its consultant. To maintain
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objectivity in the study and to avoid any appearances of conflicting
interests, NU allotted the town $38,000 to pay for the study and
gave them full responsibility for it. [9,10] In November, 1974,
The Social and Economic Impact of a Nuclear Power Plant Upon Montague,
Massachusetts and the Surrounding Area was published. [17]
The Harbridge House study analyzed Montague's future both with
and without the nuclear facility. Without the facility the town was
predicted to "closely resemble its recent past and present" with little
population increase, land-use change or economic growth. The study
predicted a tax rate increase of approximately $60 by 1985. This
increase gave Montague a total tax rate of $117 by 1985 as opposed
to a predicted $13 rate should the plant be constructed. Additionally,
with the facility, Montague would experience housing construction of
600-1000 net new units and a population increase of 25-40% over the
ten year construction period to 1985. Accompanying this growth, new
economic opportunities would occur. [17]
When the county requested a similar study from NU, the reaction
was neither as prompt nor as receptive. Surrounding Franklin County
communities fear that they will experience costs exceeding benefits;
while some jobs and tax revenues will result, these will be minimal
compared with those in Montague. Impacts, especially during the
construction phase from traffic and public service use, are expected
to outweigh these benefits. [7] Although the title on Montague's study
implies that surrounding towns were included in the analysis, the study's
contents seldom mention these other towns. NU was not willing to
promote a county-wide study similar to that completed in Montague.
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It is significant to note NU's reluctance to support a county
study expected to portray its facility unfavorably, as opposed to
its willingness to fund Montague's study, obviously a boost to
its plans. This concession to Montague favorably reflected upon
and stregthened its already strong reputation in town. NU saw no
need to establish a strong reputation in the county, though, as it
perceived little that the county could do to hinder its plans.
The Town Coordinator Position
As mentioned earlier, NU has developed a very favorable
reputation in Montague. NU realized the magnitude of the proposed
facility and the fact that Montague's part-time government would
experience difficulties preparing for and managing town affairs with
the changes it would bring. Montague selectmen expressed these
concerns to the utility in informal discussions. As a result,
NU volunteered $30,000 to fund a "town coordinator" position to help
Montague with its planning and administrative matters. [9]
Additionally, this coordinator position would assure the Harbridge
House researchers a town representative with whom to maintain frequent
contact.
Lucien Desbien, a local schoolteacher, was hired to fill this
position in June, 1974. His responsibilities were to:
1 -- "Act as an administrative assistant to selectmen in the
relationship between the town and NU.
2-- "Keep selectmen informed of the utility's action and NU
of Montague's needs during construction of the plants, as
well as providing a liaison among utility, citizen, and
official town groups on specific utility-related needs.
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3 -- "To provide assistance to NU on its administrative
responsibilities in meeting regulations and requirements
of the town.
4 -- "To act as a 'guided' spokesman for the town in relations
with appropriate state, federal and local agencies during
the construction process.
5 -- "And provide selectmen with assistance on the day-to-day
operations of their office as well as providing staff
assistance in gaining grants and procurement assistance
at state and federal levels." [13a]
After serving less than two years, Desbien was forced to vacate
his post. Sam Lovejoy had brought suit against the town of Montague
alleging a conflict of interest in relations between the coordinator
and NU. Desbien had denied Lovejoy access to written communications
between NU and Desbien which were legally public documents. The court
concurred and Desbien was removed from office. [5]
This experience alarmed Montague officials. They wanted the
facility to be successfully sited and would "do whatever they could"
to assure this outcome. [9] They had originally perceived NU's funding
of the town coordinator position as legitimate. The need for a full-
time person in town was directly a result of NU's project. If this
seemingly legitimate form of compensation by NU to Montague had turned
sour, town officials wondered what was to prevent further apparently
innocent exchanges from also involving a conflict. With this uncertainty,
Montague officials adopted a very cautious stance in which negotiations,
especially over compensation, were avoided whenever possible.
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Industrial Land Purchase
With this fear of conflict of interest,'town officials carried
on relations with the utility more selectively. The next communication
with NU occurred when Montague approached the utility to purchase a
parcel of its surplus land adjacent to the town's industrial park.
At the town meeting, purchase of sixty-four acres was approved and the
necessary $40,000 appropriated. NU immediately offered to give the
money back to the town but the Board of Selectmen refused, not wanting
to be "beholden for nothing." Fearing the potential for bribery
charges arising in such an exchange, the selectmen gave the offer
little consideration. They did not want to appear, or actually be
placed, in the position of "owing" the utility something at a later
date for this "gift." Selectmen Chairman Powers admits that a
feared conflict of interest in town-utility relations is what spurred
the board's rejection of this offer; a fear undoubtedly supported by
the town coordinator experience. [9]
Even with NU's emphasis that the offer was not a "gift," but instead
money needed by the town in accomodating the facility, this offer was
rejected. The Montague selectmen placed full support behind NU. They
wanted the plant and its tax and economic benefits to become a part
of their town. The selectmen did not want to risk losing the facility
and its benefits and thus avoided any situations which might hinder NU's
progress. Given the outcome of NU's seemingly innocent offer of the town
coordinator position which they had accepted, the selectmen predictably
rejected this new offer. NU, on the other hand, saw it to be in its
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best interests to maintain their established rapport with town officials.
Concessions to the town such as the industrial land were negligible with-
in:. the $2.3 billion to be invested in the two nuclear units.
Road Abandonments
These early concessions by NU (socioeconomic study, coordinator,
industrial land) indicated a desire both to maintain a favorable
reputation in town and to facilitate plant construction. A favorable
reputation with the county, though, seemed to be of less importance,
especially given the county's seemingly minimal influence on the siting
outcome. As becomes evident in the debate over road abandonments
requested by NU, the county did have leverage over NU and, further,
had every intention of using this leverage to its fullest potential.
Although the NRC and MEFSC site review with environmental impact
hearings and evaluations were still being scheduled, NU began seeking
local approvals, also needed for facility construction and operation.
NU felt confident that state and federal permits would be forthcoming
after these hearings. [10] Requesting various local actions posed
problems, though, which had not been foreseen. The county had still
not adopted a firm position on the proposal and did not intend to do
so until it could feel confident with whatever decision was made.
It still wanted a socioeconomic study done similar to Montague's. [7]
Both town and county roads pass through the Montague Plains site.
The utility requested both governments to officially abandon these
roads in order that their ownership would automatically revert to
NU as the adjacent landowner. These roads were the only land parcels
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not in NU's possession. Moreover, the county road abandonment decision
was the only bargaining leverage it had over the utility (the town had
further decisions regarding zoning changes, construction permits and
service extensions). NU saw little reason to expect such a request
to be rejected. The roads through the site were seldom used and
road abandonment would remove any county or town responsibility for
further maintaining them. It appeared to be an agreement in which all
parties would assuredly benefit. [10]
In Montague, NU's request was discussed at a representative town
meeting* where NU explained that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
requires utility control of the entire proposed site before licensing
hearings may begin. [10] Sam Lovejoy disagreed with NU's statement.
He claimed that the utility was "blackmailing" the town and further
cautioned that road abandonment would give NU one of the largest
"consolidated parcels" of land in Montague with essentially no
requirements on its use. Lovejoy reminded the town that road
abandonment would diminish their "already weak" bargaining position
with the utility by losing one of their few leverage points. [13c]
Despite Lovejoy's warnings, the selectmen saw no need to
negotiate. As an asset, the roads on the site meant little to the
town. The selectmen saw no reason to risk losing the facility's
fiscal benefits by turning down NU's request. Just before the town
meeting approved the roads abandonment, Selectman Powers announced:
* Many New England communities have representative town meetings --
an annual convention where elected town representatives vote on
all proposed appropriations and legislation facing the
municipality.
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"The issue is: Do we want the plant or do we not?"
Later, Lovejoy told Powers that he was "doing the utility's work
for them," to which Powers replied, "whatever we can do to promote
the plant, I will do it." [13c,g] In September, 1978, Powers reaffirmed
his support for the facility, commenting:
"...and I have not changed my mind...and not because
of monetary considerations on my part. The need for
power has been proven* and as of now nuclear is the
only proven way." [9]
While Montague saw no advantage in soliciting an exchange for
this road ownership transfer, the county perceived and acted upon
NU's request much differently. The county was more inclined to
negotiate the abandonment and much less inclined to freely dispose
of the roads than was the town. Speaking for the county commission,
Fred Muehl comments that these roads are public property and it is
therefore unwise to abandon them for a private purpose without
compensation. He emphasizes that the county is more than willing
to discuss the issue with NU but that they are not going to "roll
over and die" like Montague. He believes that the county sees its
appropriate response to be "what have you got to trade?" such that
some substantive discussions occur between the county and the
utility. [7]
The county has several concessions in mind when it mentions
"compensation" to the utility. It wants "NU to agree to.. .offsite
* Hearings verifying need have not been held yet by the NRC and MEFSC
in the Montague process.
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monitoring, an evacuation plan, choosing towers lower than the 570-foot
towers originally announced and a study of the social and economic
impact on the rest of the county, not Montague alone." Additionally,
Commission Chairman Thomas Merrigan states that, "there may be others,
too, but the more we come to agreement on, the more costly time we
will save at hearings later." [13h]
The county is wary about relinquishing their little leverage
over NU too early in the siting process, thereby losing any future
bargaining potential. Muehl calls NU's approach to obtaining road
abandonment a "class piece of hijacking strategy" given that it is
the county's only decision in the process. [7]
NU seems confused by the county's reaction to a request
traditionally viewed as non-controversial. It fails to comprehend
the county's concerns in holding on to the roads until concessions are
discussed and assured. NU quieries whether "anyone, anywhere
has had to pay for a county road abandonment?" [2] No further discussion
on county road abandonment is occurring. Muehl believes that NU knows
what it must do to gain the roads. On the other side of the river in
Montague, Selectman Powers is charging the county commissioners with
holding the roads "hostage" in the siting process. [9]
- 69 -
Turners Falls Airport Restrictions
Confusion was mounting in Montague. County road abandonment
seemed unlikely since discussions between NU and the county were at
an impasse. No one seemed able to understand how the town should deal
with the utility and respond to its requests. Although compensation
offers by NU seemed legitimate when specifically addressing impacts
imposed by NU, the town coordinator conflict-of-interest charge
surprised Montague officials. Furthermore, both the road abandonment
conflict and the industrial land transaction indicated their strong
desire for the facility. The Selectmen's full support of NU's proposal
resulted in their continual rejection of potential compensation.
With the county road abandonment issue still unresolved, NU
turned its efforts to obtaining required airport restrictions from
the Turners Falls Airport Commission. The proposed facility included
two 570-foot cooling towers. These cooling towers are designed to
withstand the impact of a 15,000 pound aircraft without producing a
'criteria accident." (An accident which results in radioactive exposure
exceeding NRC guidelines.) The cooling tower design made two restrictions
on airport use necessary so as to preclude any "criteria accidents" from
occurring. The first restriction requested was logically that no
aircraft exceeding 15,000 pounds be allowed to land or take off from
the airport. The second was that future takeoffs use a right-hand
turn pattern instead of the conventional left-hand pattern. [12,13c]
NU presented this request before the November, 1975, airport
commission meeting and the commisssion agreed to discuss and vote on
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it at their next meeting in December, 1975. At that time, the airport
commission's three members were Alfred Lucas, William Powers (no relation
to the Board of Selectmen chairman), and Winthrop Cummings. [6]
Alfred Lucas, airport commission chairman, classifies himself
as a "firm believer in negotiation." Accordingly, he sought discussions
over compensation with the utility before considering the requested
restrictions. As Lucas perceived it, NU was "taking our air space"
and should pay for it. He did not believe that the town or the
airport commission "owed" the utility such restrictions, nor that they
should just be given away. Since no offer from NU appeared to be
forthcoming, the restrictions were denied in December, 1975, by a
2-1 vote. Cummings was the lone commissioner supporting the
restrictions. [6]
Two years later, in April, 1977, NU reapplied for the restrictions.
No action was taken and, in late June, the Greenfield Recorder reported
that NU had offered the commission $35,000 for the restrictions
required by the NRC. Airport Commission Clerk George Schacht, told
the paper that "the figure was thrown on the table" at the April
meeting and was "footballed around" but never with any "legitimate
bargaining." [13d] This sudden surfacing of the offer came two months
after it had allegedly been made and one month after NU had supposedly
withdrawn it.
According to Lucas, this figure does not appear in the minutes
of the meeting and, had it been raised, that it was probably in a
purely hypothetical context. Lucas further notes that in conversations
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with airport manager and commission clerk George Schacht, and others
at the airport, a figure of $400,000 had been derived as an acceptable
amount for granting the restrictions. This amount would allow the
airport to construct a new cross-wind runway across the north-south
runway currently used. This figure was never discussed with either
the commission or the utility, though. [6] MEFSC staffmember Mary Beth
Gentleman believes that the source of the $35,000 figure was a
recently published master plan for the airport, showing that airport
expansion could occur with state and federal funds supplementing
local funds on a share basis. $35,000 would be Montague's approximate
share. [3]
The selectmen were outraged by the alleged utility offer to the
commission. They publicly renounced the commission for "putting the
arm" on NU, and requested NU to withdraw its offer. NU denied ever
having made it. [13d] The selectmen saw no reason for the utility to
pay any amount to the airport commission, perceiving that it was
probably not going to expand anyway and that the restrictions were of
little consequence to its daily or projected operations. [9] Selectman
Waidlich commented that since NU has provided almost half of Montague's
revenue for so many years, compensation for such restrictions "is not
appropriate" at this time. [13f] Selectman Powers agreed, claiming
they could approach the utility later with specific concerns and
negotiate then. Schacht noted that this was a "nice premise" but that
the town should "not give anything away." Powers replied that "you're
blackmailing the utility," to which Schacht retorted, "No. It's selling
a valuable product." [13d]
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The Selectmen perceived the commission's consideration of this
offer as an attempt to block construction of the plant. The Board
emphasized that they had not used such "ballbat tactics" when giving
the road through Montague Plains to the utility. Selectman Chairman
Powers addressed the commission, commenting that:
"We [the Board] have to decide whether we're
going to let you block the plant." [13d]
Commission Chairman Lucas replied that the commissioners "are not
opponents of nuclear power, only advocates of aviation." [13d] By
this point, though, NU had withdrawn its request for the airport
restrictions. Airport Commissioner Cummings commented that:
"One gets the feeling the deal is being
made outside the commission, because they're
[NU] avoiding us. They must feel they can
get the restrictions elsewhere." [13d]
Cummings'observation perhaps held more truth than he- realized,
for selectmen began exploring the possibility of granting NU the
restrictions in a town meeting. The Selectmen felt confident that
Montague residents would support granting the two restrictions "based
upon previous actions in favor of the utility." [9] This approach
was never advanced, though, as the Greenfield Recorder at that point
published in an editorial:
"The selectmen have the authority to clear this up
quickly. They appoint the three port commissioners.
One has resigned (Powers) and one is serving after
expiration of his term (Lucas). Northeast's mammoth
complex project deserves clear policy-making. The
Montague selectmen would do well to announce their
policy and then see that all areas of government
under their authority follow it." [13e]
Selectman Powers concurred, commenting that the surest way to alleviate
this conflict would be by the selectmen reappointing people to the
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commission who "thought they way they did." [9]
Soon afterward, the selectmen appointed Warren LeMon to the
commission seat vacated by Powers' resignation. LeMon publicly
supported the nuclear plants. Lucas was reappointed with the under-
standing that he would adopt the same posture as town officials on
this issue. [6]
After this changeover in commission membership (and presumably
ideology) NU's request for airport restrictions again went officially
before the commission. They voted 3-0 to discuss it at their next
meeting in November. This public hearing was large, with most persons
attending opposed to the restrictions. [5] Unexpectedly, a Federal
Aviation Administration representative appeared and indicated that
impacts associated with these restrictions must be determined before
the restrictions may be granted. Without such analysis, and without
approval of the Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission, federal funds
for the airport could be jeopardized. [5] At this meeting, Schacht
proposed that the town sell the airport to NU for $282,000, but
Commissioners LeMon and Cummings ignored this proposal and voted
2-0 to grant the restrictions. After the vote, Schacht exclaimed:
"You just gave them away. You just sold the town out. Never once did
you negotiate." [13i] Lucas missed this meeting as he was in Maine on
his yearly hunting trip. He considered cancelling this trip but decided
otherwise for he felt confident the vote was "destined to turn out that
way." He realized his presence at this meeting would not change the
decision outcome. [6]
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A Mitigation Council
By this point, it was becoming evident that a new approach was
needed to address needs in Montague and the surrounding county in a
manner that would not so totally confuse and frustrate officials,
intervenors and the utility. Since negotiations were constantly
stifled and compensation viewed clearly with suspicion, an alternative
was needed that could structure and guide further attempts at
conflict resolution.
The MEFSC realized the county's difficulties in determining what
impacts to expect and thus developing a response to NU's proposal.
They further realized the town's reluctance to even pursue or discuss
these matters. Thus, the MEFSC began encouraging both governments to
consider establishing a mitigation council as a provision to NU's final
licensing. This council would allocate responsibility to address
specific impacts as they arise during the four project phases: pre-
construction, construction, post-construction and entombment. [3]
The mitigation council idea was never fully discussed or developed
before NU postponed construction dates for its facility for a
third time. The following issues remain unresolved:
-- Who should serve on the council?
-- What does "mitigating an impact" actually mean to them?
-- How should responsibility for impacts be allocated?
-- What impacts will qualify for mitigation and who makes
this decision?
Selectman Powers sees these issues as delineating the "gray areas"
of uncertainty surrounding the proposal. He readily agrees that
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advantages exist in having criteria established which indicate where
responsibilities lie when problems arise. [9] The county hopes this
council would specifically place responsibility upon the utility for
problems such as traffic congestion control, road repairs, service
burdens, court costs and security costs. [7]
NU agrees that responsibility should be allocated for mitigating
impacts but never fully accepted (or rejected) the mitigation council
idea; it would rather deal directly with individual towns as problems
arise than through a council. [10] County commissioners feel, since
Franklin County governments are part-time, that direct communication
with NU when impacts arise will be less likely to occur than would
action by a mitigation council established precisely for that purpose.
13,4,7] Montague selectmen, on the other hand, are indifferent. [9]
The MEFSC hopes that a mitigation council would assuage fears that
the utility and other parties will not accept responsibility for
impacts. Further, it hopes that such a council would reduce time-
consuming attempts in the siting process to outline all possible
impacts when so many uncertainties are involved. The MEFSC also hopes
that the mitigation council would provide an incentive for the utility
to further minimize impacts. [3] Unfortunately, the mitigation council
would not illuminate nor compensate for the less-quantifiable social
costs such as aesthetic impact of the cooling towers or uneasiness
accompanying such close proximity to a nuclear plant.
Should the mitigation council idea become more fully developed and
accepted by the town and county, the MEFSC and NRC must approve it before
it is an actual licensing condition.
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Analysis
Bargaining Leverage
The Grayrocks Dam case success is contrasted by Montague's
failure. Although Montague selectmen did possess bargaining leverage
over NU, selectmen did not perceive any advantage in negotiating.
Negotiations did not promise a "better" outcome for them. Instead,
negotiations were viewed as an irrational risk to this desired economic
stimulus for their town. Benefits from NU's facility were clearly
perceived as outweighing costs. The observed, and rationally expected
position, therefore, was for these selectmen not only to not negotiate,
but to further prevent other parties from doing so and thereby risking
Montague's facility. Sam Lovejoy's warning about their "already weak"
bargaining leverage was understandably ignored.
Perceptions of Negotiations & Compensation
Adverse perceptions of negotiations and compensation as arising
out of "back room deals" were perpetuated in Montague when the town
was charged with a conflict of interest in NU's town coordinator
association. Although NU's original offer to fund this position and
thus supplement Montague's unprepared planning resources seemed legitimate,
allegations upheld in court indicated otherwise. This experience
strengthened the Selectmen's attitudes in questioning compensation
and negotiation.
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The Structure of the Siting Process
The structure of the siting process, combined with the apparent
adverse perceptions of compensation and negotiation, helped to
preclude their use. Without distinguishing between the two terms,
Montague Selectman Walter Garbiel stated his position on the airport
restrictions request by NU:
"I might be willing to negotiate but I will
draw the line at bargaining." [13d]
His comment suggests apprehension about the legitimacy of negotiations
and compensation agreements as well as a misunderstanding of the
meaning of negotiation. In Montague generally, negotiations posed an
often confusing and frustrating stumbling block for the town, utility
and intervenors. Agreement was difficult to achieve as to when
compensation was justified, what form the compensation should take
and the terms under which negotiation over compensation should occur.
As no established framework existed in the siting process for guiding
and legitimizing negotiations, discussions most often centered on the
question of means rather than the much disputed ends.
Traditional Expectations
Traditional expectations of the siting process also posed an
obstacle for negotiations and compensation. Never before have
negotiations been in the forefront of community-developer relations
although, rationally, there is no reason for them not to be. Montague
selectmen do not understand why other towns in the county are suddenly
so concerned with the distribution of tax benefits and construction
impacts associated with the facility. Powers comments that Montague
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observed "huge benefits go to Erving in particular, and Northfield
from reservoir pumped storage facilities but didn't take on the
same attitude." [9] Similarly, NU was caught by surprise when payment
for road abandonment and airport restrictions was requested. Never
before have they encountered such suggestions.
Negotiations over Compensation
Compensation, by definition, is used to repay specific costs
imposed. If perceived as a gift or a reward for cooperation, accusations
of "selling out" or being "bought off" acquire a certain validity.
If compensation is not directed at a specific cost, it is easy to
understand why adverse perceptions arise. Another problem utilities
may encounter when compensation offers are undirected and not
determined through negotiations, is a ratchet effect. In later siting
attempts, communities will expect "at least as much" as was "given"
to the previous site community.
The Greenfield Recorder noted Montague's inclinations in an
editorial:
"Perhaps under the influence of then new member
William J. Powers, the selectmen appeared to
adopt a more acceptable attitude: The town
would do what it could to help Northeast but
it would not accept money, unless, in fact,
impact or damages required municipal expense.
When soon after Northeast asked to be given the
town's rights to undeveloped roads through the
sandy scrub-brush-covered plains, the selectmen
proposed that town meeting members do so without
charge. Some members wanted to charge Northeast
but the majority agreed with the selectmen." [13e]
Requesting compensation only for those impacts requiring municipal
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expense apparently became the town's policy. Given Montague's support
for the facility, this was the rational position to adopt.
For example, in Montague's industrial land purchase from NU,
the selectmen faced this dilemma. NU justified its offer to return
the purchase price to the town, stating that the proposed facility
would no doubt impose various costs on the town. This money, if given
back to Montague, could be used to overcome these costs. Because
the offer was not directed at specific impacts, though, selectmen
viewed the offer as a gift and rejected it with little discussion.
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Summary
In summary, the Montague case illustrates several obstacles
precluding compensation and negotiation in the siting process:
1 -- Parties to a conflict must possess "something to trade"
as well as "something to gain" in negotiations before
negotiations will occur.
2 -- Sufficient information is necessary before concerned
groups can adopt a position on a proposal and participate
in negotiations concerning the proposal.
3 -- Compensation offers are viewed as suspect; as entailing
a conflict of interest.
4 -- Negotiations are not completely understood. Bargaining
is viewed as illegitimate.
5 -- The balance of power in the siting process lies with the
government officials where it has traditionally been.
These officials see it to be their responsibility to act
in the public's interest and do not view negotiations
involving other interests as appropriate.
6 -- As structured, the siting process does not accomodate and
guide negotiations.
7 -- Absolutist groups do not view negotiations as a rational
strategy to adopt.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
Obstacles to Negotiations & Compensation
The case presentations and analyses in Chapters II and III indicate
several reasons why compensation and negotiation, while apparently
desirable additions to the siting process, are not frequently observed.
Both cases illustrate, to varying degrees, the problems hypothesized in
Chapter I. Further, the Montague and Grayrocks cases reveal several
additional difficulties not apparent when discussing compensation and
negotiation from the theoretical perspective of Chapter I.
The Structure of the Siting Process
First, the siting process contains no established network within
which communication may occur between the developer and those groups
opposed to a particular project. The developer is given the over-
whelming responsibility of acting in the public interest by minimizing
costs -- including social costs -- without being provided any incentive
to actually do so. Equally as overwhelming, government officials are
charged with assuring that the developer has fulfilled this responsibility.
Hearings and permitting proceedings, combined with the utility's
proposal docket reviews, supposedly provide decision-makers with enough
relevant information to make this determination. But, the siting process
has apparently failed to address all interests at stake in various siting
proposals. It leaves many parties unrepresented and with no means to
effectively represent themselves.
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The structure of the current siting process encourages concerned
groups to adopt, as their only viable option, adversarial responses
to proposed facilities. While the process allows such groups to
intervene in formal permitting and licensing hearings involving
federal, state and local officials, intervenor status does not allow
these groups any participation in official decision-making. Beyond
surfacing concerns and potentially influencing official decision-makers,
the intervenor position contains little leverage with which to attain
developer action on their needs. This lack of early involvement and
unintentional encouragement of adversarial positions leads to
distrust instead of trust and cooperation among various parties to the
conflict.
Administrative Difficulties
The second problem area involves difficulties encountered when
parties actually do consider using negotiations and including compensation
as part of their proposal evaluations. As evidenced in the two cases,
people are unclear on how to proceed with negotiations, when negotiations
are appropriate, how to calculate the appropriate amount as well as
type of compensation, or what form agreements should take. Often,
people do not possess the essential "something to trade" such that
negotiations may be meaningfully pursued. Further, even should this
bargaining leverage be possessed by all parties, it is possible that
some parties will still perceive greater advantages in alternate
approaches (ie. litigation). When alternate approaches lead to outcomes
satisfying their interests "better," concerned parties will not pursue
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negotiations.
Traditional Expectations
The third problem area is caused by traditional expectations of
the siting process. Compensation and negotiation have seldom been
applied to siting energy facilities. As a result, their use is not
naturally considered as an option by government officials, utilities
or individuals concerned about a specific proposal.
Utilities are accustomed to proposing their facilities, acquiring
local, state and federal permits and approvals, employing whatever
public involvement is required and, finally, proceeding with facility
construction and operation. Historically, this approach has been
successful from their perspective. Thus, negotiations are seldom
considered and rationally not advanced.
Government officials and regulators are accustomed to fulfilling
their responsibilities by enforcing established rules and regulations,
not negotiating over them. Further, their roles, as well as the rules
and regulations they enforce, are assumed to be in the "public interest."
Further involvement of outside groups seems a redundant addition to
their efforts. In theory, negotiations seem unnecessary given the
intent behind the established rules and regulations.
Community groups and individuals are involved in the process
through public hearings. Seldom do they have a more direct communication
with utility officials than through their elected government representa-
tives. As opposition by such groups increased without a formal means
for considering and acting upon the concerns underlying the opposition,
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litigation was advanced. Now, litigation has become the approach
concerned groups are accustomed to adopting and seeing adopted.
Actor Perceptions and Attitudes
The fourth problem area arises because people view compensation
and negotiation with suspicion. Compensation to many people implies
being "bribed," "bought off" or "selling out" to the developer.
Negotiations imply "back room deals" and are therefore considered
inappropriate. Negotiations are often not deemed more desirable
than litigation. Oftentimes, this litigation is the approach an
organization is accustomed to pursuing and which has proven successful
in the past. Sierra Club President Theodore Snyder, explains that
his inclination "is to be more combative, to adhere to our principles
longer, and to resist giving up anything in a compromise until all other
efforts to achieve our goals have been exhausted." Moreover, he
comments that "environmental litigation certainly has achieved many
gains for us and is extremely important... it's an important part of
our program." [4] Negotiations and compensation agreements are thus
viewed frequently as a second-best approach to advancing interest groups'
concerns.
Other Problem Areas
This paper revealed two additional obstacles hindering application
of compensation and negotiation to the energy facility siting process.
Mancur Olson's "logic of collective2 action" [3] explains why
individuals often do not actively pursue an end which benefits them to a
small extent but society greatly. Compensation and negotiation will do
4
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little to change the incentive structure causing many people affected
by a project to remain uninvolved. Thus, their costs and benefits
and concerns will remain unaccounted and unconsidered in project
evaluations.
Further, compensation and negotiation do not address the concerns
of those groups adopting "absolutist" positions. Groups opposed to
a facility on ideological grounds will continue to be opposed with or
without compensation or negotiation as part of the siting process.
Research into these two areas is needed before either may be more
fully understood and possible strategies developed to address them.
This thesis yields little insight into the potential resolution of
these two difficulties.
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Steps Toward Compensation & Negotiation
In the Energy Facility Siting Process
Compensation and negotiation are new concepts to energy facility
siting. Before they may be effectively applied to the siting process,
those difficulties evidenced in the two cases must first be overcome.
While further analysis of siting problems needs to occur before specific
changes may be recommended, this presentation indicates several initial
steps deserving consideration. General steps directed specifically at
shortcomings observed in the current siting process, will be presented
below.
The Structure of the Siting Process
Involve those to be affected by a proposed facility as early as
possible in facility planning and the siting process. Early in-
volvement allows concerned parties, government officials and utilities
to realize the full range of costs and benefits as well as alternatives
to proposals sooner in facility planning. Utilities will be better able
to accomodate these concerns in their planning and accounting if the
concerns surface earlier than in the current process. Consensus building
steps in the process may encourage various groups to work together in
evaluating tradeoffs and developing the final proposal.
Administrative Difficulties
Establish guidelines for using compensation and negotiation.
These guidelines would accompany structural changes in the siting
process and should clearly outline:
-- how to structure and organize negotiations with consideration
to circumstances that vary among siting cases
- 87 -
-- how negotiations should proceed
-- who participates in the negotiations
-- how to determine the appropriate amount and type
of compensation
-- what role formal governments should play in negotiations
and compensation agreements
-- who should initiate and oversee or mediate the negotiations
if necessary
-- how information can be used and disseminated earlier in
the siting process
-- how to allocate bargaining leverage among parties perceived
to have legitimate interests at stake in a particular
proposal
-- what form a final compensation agreement should take
Traditional Expectations
Traditional expectations of the siting process that exclude
negotiation and compensation can only be overcome through structural
and administrative changes to the current process. When structural
flaws impeding negotiations are offset, and when guidelines are
established directing the effective use of both negotiations and
compensation, then these traditional expectations should be
undermined.
Actor Perceptions & Attitudes
Problems involving the legitimacy of negotiations and compensation
agreements will be addressed when guidelines are established clarifying
and encouraging their use. Additionally, structural changes incorporat-
ing negotiations into the process, should offset current misunderstand-
ings. Any official recognition and acceptance of compensation and
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negotiation (ie. guidelines or structural changes) should help to
legitimize both compensation and negotiation.
Concluding Comment
The above steps will not assure the effective use of compensation
and negotiation in the energy facility siting process. Instead, these
steps should guide further analysis into current siting problems
and their potential resolution. Additionally, these steps may allow
other problems to surface that were not realized in the two case analyses
in this paper. The implications of various problems and alternative
solutions should be understood and addressed in a coordinated manner
when developing new policies for energy facility siting.
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The Prospects for Compensation & Negotiation
Recent legislation and court cases give bargaining leverage to
community and environmental groups choosing to intervene in the siting
process. As a result, these groups have become more influential in
the decisions of traditional economic interests. The current siting
process must be adjusted to accomodate the broader interests and
influence of these people. Negotiations and compensation agreements
are potential additions to the siting process which may serve this need.
While several obstacles do hinder their use, changes to the siting
process should be able to overcome these and encourage negotiations and
compensation to occur.
Although advances must still be made, negotiations and compensation
are now viewed with greater legitimacy than before. As became clear
in the Grayrocks case, attitudes towards negotiation and compensation
are changing. Further, these concepts are becoming accepted beyond
individual case levels and into the policy levels of utility and special
interest group leadership. Richard Swisher, a Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) socioeconomic impact mitigation program representative,
describes TVA's new attitude toward compensation for energy development
impacts, one much different from that previously advanced by TVA:
"Impact assistance programs that attempt to mitigate
the negative effects of rapid energy development
should be looked on as part of the cost of the
project." [2]
Similarly, at a recent conference on environmental mediation, Michael
McCloskey, executive director of the Sierra Club, emphasized the need
for "direct negotiation between adversaries" to overcome the
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polarization of traditionally opposed groups. He believes these groups
have considerable common ground between them that should be realized
and pursued. [1]
These changing attitudes towards compensation and negotiation,
combined with the realization that alternatives to the current siting
process are in order, will promote the increased application of
compensation and negotiation in the future. Should it be decided
in formal policy arenas that incorporating compensation and negotiation
into the facility siting process is indeed desired, then the obstacles
outlined here must first be overcome.
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